BY JOHN FARMER
(as reviewed in The
Star-Ledger, June 11, 2006)
Tom Kean was not the most important governor in the modern history of New
Jersey -- that honor belongs to the late Alfred E. Driscoll -- but Kean was
unquestionably the most popular. And, with the exception of President Woodrow
Wilson, he has made the greatest impact on the national stage.
The life and times of New Jersey's 48th governor, his many pluses and few
minuses, are explored in detail in Alvin S. Felzen berg's voluminous biography
of Kean, published this month by Rivergate Books, a Rutgers University Press
imprint. It's not an authorized biography, but no authorized version is likely
to be more laudatory.
Felzenberg, who worked in the Kean administration in Trenton and as spokesman
for the 9/11 commission Kean chaired, likes and admires his subject. Understandably
so. There's not much to dislike about Tom Kean or to disapprove of in his
four-decade public career.
Even old foes offer little criticism, at least in Felzenberg's ac count. "Tom
did not do bad things," says one ex-rival, former Gov. Jim Florio. And
former state Senate President John Russo, another Democrat who fought fre
quently with Kean, is quoted say ing that "when the history of Tom Kean
is written no one will be able to challenge his belief in the children of
the state."
Actually, when history takes a look at Tom Kean its applause will be reserved
not so much for his tenure as governor but for his exemplary leadership of
the 9/11 commission's exploration of intelligence failures prior to the terrorist
at tacks of Sept. 11, 2001. (I had a closer view of his efforts than most;
my son, former New Jersey Attor ney General John Farmer Jr., served as senior
counsel to the 9/11 commission.)
Despite the egos and political tensions within the 10-member bipartisan commission
and the obstructionism of the Bush White House, Kean steered the group to
a unanimous report and recommendations that led to a restructuring of the
U.S. intelligence establishment.
It was his finest hour.
Kean began life as a shy child with a serious stutter, hardly assets for an
aspiring politician. But other influences inevitably put him on a path to
politics. Two relatives had served in the U.S. Senate from New Jersey, and
his father, Robert, represented a New Jersey district in the House of Representatives
for 20 years before losing his own bid for a Senate seat. Living for stretches
in Washington and helping in his father's failed Senate campaign, young Tom
Kean saw politics up close. And he liked it.
Though no great student, Kean was the child of an aristocratic family and
was educated at St. Mark's, an exclusive prep school in Massachusetts modeled
on English boarding schools -- compulsory sports and cold showers -- and at
Princeton University. His upbring ing and education left him with a style
of speech -- almost British in its accent -- seemingly alien to gritty New
Jersey. It also accorded him a sense of noblesse oblige manifest in his commitment
as a young man to helping the underprivileged, first as a camp counselor and
later with a private foundation.
Kean's early career interest lay in teaching, especially history, but the
pull of politics proved stronger. In November 1967, Kean was elected to the
state Assembly in an anti-Democratic tide created by urban rioting, the Vietnam
war and weariness with an expiring Democratic administration in Trenton.
"In his navy blazer, gray slacks and penny loafers, Kean could eas ily
have passed for the graduate student he had been just four years earlier,"
Felzenberg writes. "In his manner of speech, demeanor and appearance,
he bore no resemblance to the kind of politician I had grown accustomed to
seeing. He seemed more like a Republican version of John F. Kennedy ..."
Kean's rapid rise through the Assembly leadership ranks sets the stage for
his run for governor. But his Assembly career also produced the one major
stain on his record -- a crass deal with a brilliant but de vious Hudson County
Democrat, David Friedland. Friedland delivered the Democratic votes in 1972
that made Kean, at 36, the youngest Assembly speaker in the state's history.
In return, Kean handed Friedland half of the speaker's patronage, plus chairmanship
of the bipartisan Conference Committee, with power to move legislation to
the floor for a vote.
The press, for the first time (and the last), landed hard on Kean. An exercise
in "cynical expe diency," The Star-Ledger called the Kean-Friedland
deal. "What in heaven's name was a nice guy like Tom Kean doing getting
mixed up in a wheeler-dealer game" with the likes of Friedland, The Star-Ledger's
political columnist, Frank Gregory, asked.
The deal preoccupied the press for weeks but, surprisingly, aroused little
public interest. The Friedland bargain, Felzenberg concludes, worked to Kean's
advantage. He had, it seemed, a kind of Reaganes que Teflon quality.
From that time forward, Kean's eye was on the real prize -- the governor's
office -- and, after a flir tation with the idea of running in 1977, he finally
won the office in 1981 over Florio in the closest gu bernatorial election
in New Jersey history. Four years later he would win re-election by the largest
gu bernatorial margin the state had ever seen, sweeping all 21 counties, including
Hudson, home to the historically powerful Democratic machine.
This was a testament to Kean's skillful use of the governor's considerable
powers, coupled with his own boyish charm and what Fel zenberg calls his "third
way" politics -- an artful passage between the right-wing conservatives
in his own party and the leftist excesses in the Democratic camp.
Felzenberg paints Kean's time as governor as something special. And it was,
especially in the realms of education and tourism (recall the slogan "New
Jersey and You: Perfect Together" -- or, as Kean pronounced it, "Puhfect
together"). His immense popularity and the clout it gave him to get things
done in Trenton lifted the image of the state. But he owed some of his suc
cess to two of his predecessors and a large slice of economic luck -- facts
not much noted by Felzenberg.
Kean, like all New Jersey governors, was indebted to Republican Al Driscoll,
a political genius who coaxed, cajoled and cosseted the state's warring Democratic
and Republican machines into accepting a radical Constitutional revision in
1947. That revision transformed the governor's office from the weakest in
the nation to the most powerful, reformed a sclerotic and corrupt court system,
curbed much of the power of county machines to dic tate to the governor, and
empowered Driscoll to begin creation of the New Jersey Turnpike and the Garden
State Parkway.
About the only thing Driscoll left undone was repairing the state government's
inadequate financial base. And that was handled by Brendan Byrne, the man
Kean replaced as governor in 1981. Byrne, in whose administration I served
for a year as director of public information, broke the decades-long anti-tax
spell in the state by enact ing, with help from the state Supreme Court, a
state income tax. (Dialogues between Kean and Byrne on political issues are
published regularly in Perspective.)
Kean came to office in the midst of a national recession. But for the bulk
of his eight years as governor he enjoyed the bounty of the Reagan-era recovery
that, combined with the state's broader tax base (breaking his own campaign
pledge, Kean also raised taxes), poured the cash into Tren ton that financed
Kean's ambitious education and environmental agendas.
He left the governor's office in January 1990, with higher approval ratings
than any governor in at least a half-century. He seemed a sure bet for federal
office -- the U.S. Senate, perhaps, or maybe a Cabinet job. He was ambitious
enough, and although he was a proclaimed moderate, he could trim his sails
to suit a conservative audience, as demonstrated by his keynote speech to
the 1988 GOP convention that nominated the elder George Bush for president.
Holding up an hourglass, he assured the convention that "time had run
out on the liberal vision of America."
In the end, Kean reverted to his first love, education, by signing on as president
of Drew University in Madison rather than continuing in politics. He might
have run out his string at Drew except for the 9/11 commission and the role
it played in exposing the tangle of turf wars, failed communications, personal
rivalries and bureaucratic incompe tence that hamstrung U.S. intelligence
prior to the terrorist attacks of 2001.
President Bush, who opposed the commission, chose Kean as its head when he
couldn't get Henry Kissinger, notorious for his willingness to accommodate
power, not confront it. Kean was deemed equally accommodating, someone who
preferred cooperation to confrontation. Bush misread his man.
Kean understood, as Felzen berg points out, that the commis sion's report
would have to be unanimous or it would be ripped apart by partisans in Congress.
Kean's accommodating nature was just the quality needed to keep commission
members together. He went out of his way, for instance, to make Lee Hamilton,
the vice chairman, virtually a co-chairman. When Bush balked at releasing
critical documents -- as he did frequently -- Kean's first course was persuasion,
with the threat of subpoena in the background.
He feared a public fight with the White House would doom the commission as
partisan -- or embroil it in a court fight it might lose. In the end, Kean,
under pressure from his staff, did approve subpoenas for the Defense Department,
the Federal Aviation Authority and New York City, but only as a last resort.
The result was a unanimous report, so exquisitely written that it won a National
Book Award. Kean wanted a report that would not re main unread, collecting
dust on a shelf. He wanted one that would have a dramatic impact on the nation
and on the way it girded itself for the war on terrorism. And he got it.
Far more than anything he did as governor, it's his passport to a favorable
place in history.John Farmer is The Star-Ledger's national political correspondent.
He has been covering politics for most of the last 50 years.
© 2006 The Star Ledger© 2006 NJ.com All Rights Reserved.
![]() |